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Article 3

FEDERAL CONTROL OF DEFAMATION BY RADIO*
(Concluded.)
FEDERAL POLICE POWER

Of course, the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution does not prohibit a state from exercising its police
power to protect the public health, peace, morals or general
welfare. 5 Hence, there is no attempt in this writing to demonstrate that the states can not properly operate in this
particular field. Rather it is my purpose to show that the
federal police power, which undeniably does exist, has, I
shall demonstrate, the proper authority for exercising control
in this field. It must now be regarded as firmly established
that the power of the Federal Government over commerce,
while primarily intended to be exercised in behalf of economic interests, may be used for the protection of safety,
order and morals.5 5 It is commonly said that the Federal
Government lacks "police power"; yet, whenever it exerts
any of the powers conferred upon it by the Constitution, the
Fifth Amendment imposes no greater limitation upon such
powers than does the Fourteenth Amendment upon state
56
powers.
The states have always been recognized as possessing a
police power in the exercise of which they must always look
to the public welfare. Very often, in the exercise of this power, valuable property rights have been taken away without
any compensation being made by the state. This is very
clearly brought out in the dissenting opinion of Justice
Brandeis -in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon517 wherein he
says,
*The first installment of this article appeared in the November, 1936, issue of
the Notre Dame Lawyer (Vol. 12, pp. 15-40).
54 Simpson v. Shepard ("Minnesota Rate Cases"), 230 U. S. 352 (1913);
Hannibal & St. Joseph R. R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465 (1878).
55 Champion v. Ames ("Lottery Case"), 188 U. S. 321 (1903).
56 Federal Control of Radio Broadcasting, 39 YAX. L. J. 245, 253.
57 260 U. S. 393 (1922).
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"Every restriction on the use of property, imposed in the exercise
of the police power, deprives the owner of some right theretofore enjoyed, and is, in that sense, an abridgment by the state of rights in
property without making compensation. But restriction imposed to
protect the public health, safety. or morals from dangers threatened is
not a taking. The restriction here in question is merely the prohibition
of a noxious use. The property so restricted remains in the possession
of its owner. The state does not appropriate it or make any use of it.
The state merely prevents the owner from making a use which interferes with paramount rights of the public."

The legislature determines the necessity for, and the courts
the proper subject for, the exercise of the police power extending it to the protection of lives, limbs, health, comfort
and welfare of society.5" So I might go on with niany other
cases in which the Supreme Court has upheld the exercise
of the police power as in the case of an ordinance prohibiting the keeping of billiard or pool tables for hire or public
use," or an ordinance regulating the sizes of loaves of
bread, 0 or a statute forbidding the possession of liquor,"'
or the numerous cases in which zoning ordinances have been
upheld.62 An exhaustive study of innumerable cases in which
the police power of the states has been upheld by the United
States Supreme Court might easily be given were it properly
within the province of this paper. However, before leaving
the question it is well to point out that police power of a
state, summed up very clearly and comprehensively in the
case of Miller v. Board of Public Works, 8 is closely analogous to the police power exercised by the Federal Government.
The Federal Government can not exercise police power
except in those cases where the power of regulation is granted to the Federal Government, either expressly or by nec58 Munn v. People of Illinois, 94 U. S. 77 (1877); Slaughter-House Cases,
16 Wall. 36 (1873).
59 Murphy v. California, 225 U. S. 623 (1912).
60 Schmidinger v. Chicago, 226 U. S. 578 (1913).
61 Samuels v. McCurdy, 267 U. S. 188 (1925).
62 Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926).
63 195 Cal. 477, 234 Pac. 381, 38 A. L. R. 1479 (1425), error disnhSSed, 273
U. S. 781.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

essary implication. Congress is expressly authorized to legislate upon all matters affecting interstate commerce as has
already been shown. In those instances in which Congress
has not exercised regulation in this field, a state may regulate
providing it does not impede interstate commerce." In Gibbons v. Ogden6 5 it was determined that when Congress does
regulate it has primary control over the subject and supersedes any state law which may be in conflict. There is no
doubt that the states may exercise control over navigable
waters so long as Congress has not acted, but when Congress chooses to act it is not precluded by anything that the
states have done from assuming entire control of the matter.6 6 Congress has the power to go beyond the general regulation of commerce and to determine even the minute details of such regulation, establish police regulations as well
as the states, confining their operations to the subject over
which it is given control by the Constitution." Now, there
seems to be little doubt that the power of regulating commerce is in the nature of a police power, because it aims directly to secure and promote the public welfare. The Supreme Court considers that Congress has such power as in
the Lottery Case. 8 There is no logical reason why Congress,
which is the only power which can regulate interstate commerce, does not possess over that commerce the full and
complete powers of government. This is brought out by
Judge McPherson,"D upholding the federal Pure Food and
Drug Act:
"Congress has enacted a safety appliance law for the preservation
of life and limb ....

Congress has enacted the Livestock Sanitation

Act to prevent cruelty to animals. Congress has enacted the Cattle
Contagious Disease Act to more effectively suppress and prevent the
64 Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713 (1866).
65 9 Wheat. 1 (1824).
66 Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U. S. 1 (1888); West Chicago
Street R. Co. v. Illinois ex rI. Chicago, 201 U. S.506 (1906); Louisville Bridge
Co. v. United States, 242 U. S. 409 (1917).
67 Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S.196 (1885).
68 Champion v. Ames, 188 U. S.321 (1903); FREuND, Pouicz PoW-R § 66.
69 Shawnee Milling Co. v. Temple, 179 Fed. 517 (C. C. S. D. Iowa 1910).
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spread of contagious and infectious diseases of livestock. Congress has
enacted a statute to enable the Secretary of Agriculture to establish
and maintain quarantine districts. Congress has enacted the Meat Inspection Act. Congress has enacted a Second Employer's Liability Act.
Congress has enacted the Obscene Literature Act. Congress has enacted the Lottery Statute .... Congress has enacted .. statutes pro.hibiting the sending of liquors by interstate shipment. . . These
statutes, police regulations in many respects, are alike in principle to
the Act [National Pure Food Law] of June 30, 1906, under consideration."

Since Judge McPherson has made this pronouncement, the
Supreme Court has upheld the exercise of the police power
in numerous other cases which can not be gone into in detail here but which, nevertheless, point unmistakably to the
conclusion that this powerful right of the Federal Government has been exercised in a great many instances to correct
evils which menace the public welfare in not nearly so great
a degree as the public welfare is menaced by allowing defamation by radio to go uncontrolled without the regulatory
benediction of a federal statute.
Citing further cases in which the police power of the Federal Government has been exercised, reference is made to
the "White Slave Case"; 7"the "Pure Food Case"; 71 cases
arising under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act,"2 the Federal
Safety-Appliance Act,73 the Federal Hours of Service Act,'
78
the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act, 5 the Adamson Act,
and the Grain Futures Act, 7 and to the Pipeline Case."
The federal police power has also been exercised by Congress by means of a treaty, and this power is not limited to
subjects in which it is empowered to legislate in purely
Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S. 308 (1913).
Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U. S. 45 (1911).
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S.1 (1911); Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S.197 (1904).
73 Southern R. Co. v. United States, 222 U. S.20 (1911).
74 Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Interstate Com. Comm'n, 221 U. S. 612 (1911).
75 Brooks v. United States, 267 U. S. 432 (1925).
76 Wilson v. New, 243 U. S.331 (1917).
77 Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U. S.1 (1923).
78 Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 204 Fed. 798 (Com. Ct. 1913).
70

71
72
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domestic affairs. 79 The United States Constitution confers
upon the Federal Government exclusive powers to make
treaties with foreign governments."0 We have, then, two
grounds upon which the right of the Federal Government to
exercise its police power in controlling defamation by radio
may squarely rest, namely, the power to regulate interstate
commerce and the power to make treaties with foreign governments. The Migratory Bird Case"1 is the leading one illustrative of the power to enact legislation to effect the execution of a treaty.
It is to be closely noted here that in substantiating the
right of the Federal Government to further legislate in this
particular field I have not based this right upon any of the
emergency powers, so called, which would confer upon the
Federal Government complete control in time of a national
emergency and which has been severely criticized as an
abridgment of the right of freedom of speech of the people
of the United States. Thus, it has been claimed 82. that President Roosevelt holds the power of a censor of radio broadcasting by virtue of the authority granted him in the Communications Act of 1934. It is pointed out that the Communications Act gives the President arbitrary and unqualified power to close down and confiscate any radio station
during a "national emergency," such as the New Deal proclaims, without giving any explanation for his actions. Objection is made not that this power has been abused but that
the power may not properly be granted under our constitutional set-up.88
Justification for the exercise of federal police power in
respect to control of defamation by radio might have been.
placed on the right of Congress to pass police restrictions un79

Ross v. McIntyre, 140 U. S. 453 (1891).

80

U. S. CONsT. Art I, § 10, Art. II, § 2.

81

Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416 (1920).

82

Caldwell, Freedom of Speech and Radio Broadcasting, in "Radio, The Fifth

Estate," Axnq. s, Aa-REpic

ACADEmY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAl SCIENCE, Vol. 77,

citing section 606 (c) of the Communications Act of 1934.
83 See, in this connection, MIL, ON LIBERTY (Everyman's ed.) 77.
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der the taxing power.84 It might also have been placed upon
various other justifiable powers of the Federal Government
which, however, fade into insignificance and unimportance
in the presence of the thoroughly constitutional right granted under federal control of interstate commerce and the
treaty power of the United States. Certainly the Communications Act of 1934, in addition to being enacted pursuant
to the right to control interstate commerce, as shown, could
logically be held to be valid because it renders effective provisions of international treaty or convention relating to radio
entered into by the United States.
Further strengthening the argument for the language used
in a number of leading cases to the effect that when the
United States exerts any of the powers conferred upon it by
the Constitution, no valid objection can be based upon the
fact that such exercise may be attended by some or all of
the incidents which attend the exercise by a state of its
police power.8 5 Alfred Russell " has expressed the thought
that as a state develops politically, economically and socially, the police power also develops to meet these changing
conditions. Certainly the same thought can be applied to
the federal police power, and by the same token such power
may be extended to federal control of defamation by radio,
for what better exemplification of changing conditions to be
covered by political, economic and social development can
be found than here?
Much attention has been given by the Supreme Court to
demonstrate that vested interest or vested property rights
can not, because of conditions once obtaining, be exerted
against the proper exercise of the police power.8 7 The term
"vested right" is here meant to imply a vested interest which
84 Gilmore v. United States, 268 Fed. 719 (C. C. A. 5th, 1920); United States
v. Doremus, 249 U. S. 86 (1919); Oliver v. United States, 267 Fed. 545 (C. C. A.
4th, 1920).
85 Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & W. Co., 251 U. S. 146 (1919); Rup.pert v. Caffey, 251 U. S. 264 (1920).
86

RussEu,, POLICE POWER OF

87

Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Tranbarger, 238 U. S. 67 (1915).

E STATE (1900).
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it is right and equitable for the Federal Government to recognize and protect and of which the individual could not
be deprived arbitrarily without injustice. But a person has
no vested right in a statutory privilege or in a license granted.88 However, by virtue of a special provision of the Communications Act of 1934,89 there is no vested right or property interest granted in a license. Further, federal control of
defamation by radio does not involve a deprivation of any
vested right in property but is only an exercise of the paramount right of the government to so regulate the use of
property so as not to be inimical to the public welfare, which
is within the province of all police power, state and federal,
the power which is the least limitable of the powers of government. 0

Our argument here gains greater strength when we examine closely the exercise of federal police power under the
National Motor Vehicle Theft Act which was upheld by the
United States Supreme Court on the theory of a proper exercise of federal police power in the field of interstate commerce.9 Radio communication legislation is certainly valid
under the same process of reasoning. 2
Persons engaging in a business affected with a public interest must be prepared to accept regulation. All radio
licenses are granted only upon this condition and may, therefore, be revoked without liability on the theory of confiscation of property. This doctrine is well established.9" It has
88 Pratt v. Brown, 3 Wis. 603 (1854); Horn v. State of Ohio, I Ohio St.
15 (1852).
89

§ 301.

District of Columbia v. Brooks, 214 U. S. 138 (1909).
Brooks v. United States, 267 U. S. 432 (1925).
92 See: Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & W. Co., 251 U. S. 146 (1919);
United States v. American Bond & Mortgage Co., 31 Fed. (2d) 448 (N. D. 111.
90
91

1929).
93

General Electric Co. v. Federal Radio Commission, 31 Fed. (2d) 630 (App.
D. C. 1929); Technical Radio Laboratory v. Federal Radio Commission, 36 Fed.
(2d) 112 (App. D. C. 1929); City of New York v. Federal Radio Commission,
36 Fed. (2d) 115 (App. D. C. 1929).
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been repeatedly held that regulation of radio is a valid exercise of the power of Congress under the Commerce
Clause. 4
Examination of the class of radio communications held to
be interstate commerce certainly shows that commercial
point-to-point, shore-to-ship, and the ship-to-ship services
are within the classification because of the means employed
for such communication. 5 Amateur communications are also
within the classification as they impose a burden on interstate commerce even though they might of themselves be
intrastate only. Certainly defamation by radio is a more
direct burden on interstate commerce than were diseased
cattle which strayed across a state line and which were held
to be a burden on interstate commerce.96
STATE AND MUNICIPAL REGULATION

Whenever the interstate and intrastate transactions of
carriers are so related that the movement of one involves the
control of the other, it is Congress and not the state that is
entitled to prescribe the final and dominant rule, for, otherwise, Congress would be denied the exercise of its constitutional authority and the state and not the Nation would be
supreme within the national field. 7 This pronouncement of
the Supreme Court of the United States is helpful in viewing, as I intend now to do, the legislation which the various
states have enacted with respect to radio broadcasting. In
1929 the statement was made 9 that a surprisingly large
amount of radio legislation is to be found in the statute
94 White v. Federal Radio Commission, 29 Fed. (2d) 113 (N. D. Ill. 1928);
United States v. American Bond & Mortgage Co., 31 Fed. (2d) 448 (N. D. Ill.
1929).
95 See: Pensacola Tel. Co. v. West. Union Tel. Co., 96 U. S. 1 (1878); Western Union Teleg. Co. v. Missouri ex rel. Gottlieb, 190 U. S. 412 (1903); Western
Union Teleg. Co. v. Speight, 254 U. S. 17 (1920). See, also, 24 Op. Att'y Gen'l 100.
96 Thornton v. United States, 271 U. S. 414 (1926).
97 Houston, E. & T. R. Co. v. United States, 234 U. S. 342 (1914).
98 Report of the Standing Committee on Radio Law of the American Bar
Association, presented at the Annual Meeting at Memphis, Tenn., October 23-25,

1929.
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books of the several states and in ordinances of cities, towns
and villages. Indeed, in 1930 the State of New Jersey " enacted a minature Radio Act of its own restricting its operation of broadcasting. Again the report of the Communications Committee of the American Bar Association,' 00 in 1931,
stated that the amount of state legislation bearing directly
or indirectly on radio communication continues to increase,
at least with respect to number of bills introduced in the
state legislatures.
The report of the Communications Committee of the
American Bar Association for 1932

101

made this statement:

"In the absence of any pronouncement by the United States Supreme Court and with only a very few decisions by other courts, the
boundary line between federal and state jurisdiction in radio regulation continues vague and obscure. As a result, states and cities are
continually adding to the list of enactments of doubtful validity.
This tendency has been given emphasis during the recent past by
legislation imposing license fees or privilege taxes of one sort or another on the operation of broadcasting stations and of receiving sets."

The same trend toward state legislation is noticeable in the
Communications Committee Report of the American Bar
Association for 1933."02 The report read, in part:
"Although the past year has seen great activity in the several state
legislatures and a great many bills were introduced touching communication agencies, and particularly radio broadcast stations and companies, attempts at such legislation were largely abortive. The demand
for such legislation arose generally for a desire and a need for new
sources of revenue. The objection to such legislation, which prevailed
in practically all instances involving radio, was invalidity as an attempted usurpation of the purely federal function of regulating interstate and foreign commerce."

The year 1934 saw no abatement of the rush for legislation affecting radio by the states. Problems resulting from
state legislation have reached the stage where they may
represent a new and added burden on the broadcasting in99
SENATE 116 (introduced by Mr. Yates, February 3, 1930). See U. S. Daily,
Mar. 15, 1930.
100 Presented at the 54th Annual Meeting at Atlantic City, N. J. (1931).
101 Presented at the 55th Annual Meeting at Washington, D. C. (1932).
102 Presented at the 56th Annual Meeting at Grand Rapids, Michigan (1933).

FEDERAL CONTROL OF DEFAMATION BY RADIO

143

dustry far more serious than any other burden so far placed
upon the industry. An interesting summary of some of the
more important types of state legislation on this particular
subject is contained in a recent report '0o of the National Association of Broadcasters. I quote from the report as follows:
"Arizona H. 118 provides for a general sales tax of 1 per cent on
gross revenues, specifically including radio advertising.
"Kansas S. 331 and H. 438 provide for a general sales tax on services, specifically including radio broadcasting. This bill has just been
stricken from the calendar but may be introduced again.
"Missouri S. 33 provides for a tax of 3 per cent on gross receipts,
specifically including radio advertising.
"New Mexico S. 1, which has passed both houses, provides a 2 per
cent sales tax on gross receipts, specifically including radio broadcasting.
"Oklahoma H. 440 provides for a 3 per cent tax on gross sales,
specifically including broadcasting.
"Pennsylvania H. 1353, just introduced, provides for special taxes
on telephone messages and broadcasting, the tax on broadcasting being 2 per cent of the gross receipts.
"Texas S. 62 and H. 661 provide for general sales taxes, including
a tax of 2 3/4 per cent on the gross receipts of radio broadcasting.
As a further measure of control, Texas S. 421 provides that every
-broadcasting station must file detailed semi-annual reports with the
state comptroller.
"Washington already has a sales tax bill which, in its application to
broadcasting, is now under consideration by the State Supreme Court.
In addition, the Washington House, on March 10, passed H. 237, a
general tax bill, including a tax on all radio broadcasting stations
amounting to 10 cents per watt of rated power annually.
"West Virginia already has a tax on all amusement enterprises, including broadcasting, and H. 527 and S. 274 propose an amendment
to this Act making the tax 2 of 1 per cent on gross revenue. Broadcasting is specifically included in both these bills.
"The foregoing outline indicates what the broadcasting industry is
immediately facing in the way of taxation if it is found that broadcasting revenues are subject to state taxes. Obviously, however, this
would only be the beginning. On the other hand, the whole structure
of federal regulation of radio rests on the assumption that all radio
transmission, including broadcasting, is exclusively interstate com103

3 N. A. B. Rep. 753 (1935).
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merce. If it is held by the courts that some broadcasting is intrastate
in character, the results, both in imposing enormous additional burdens
on the broadcasters, and in breaking down the whole structure of
federal regulation, are simply incalculable."

Nor is the state interference in regulation and control of
radio limited to the legislative branch of the government.
The judicial branch of the state governments is also active.
The outstanding development in this field is the announcment on March 11, 1935, that the United States Supreme
Court will review the findings of the Supreme Court of
Georgia in the case of the City of Atlanta v. Oglethorpe University,14 a case which is of vital importance to the entire
broadcast industry. The City of Atlanta imposed a license
fee of $300 per year on all broadcast stations. Oglethorpe
University, which operates Station WJTL, went to the
courts and a first decision was rendered by the Supreme
Court of Georgia. This decision held in substance that even
though some of the messages from WJTL might go beyond
the State lines, that fact would not make the broadcasting
of the station interstate commerce. After this first decision
the case went back for trial to the lower court on the merits
of the case. The trial judge directed a verdict for the defendant, the City of Atlanta, and the case was again appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Georgia. The
decision of this court, handed down January 21, 1935, sustained the trial judge in directing a verdict for the defendant.
This decision, manifestly based on an apparent admission in
the pleadings that a considerable part of the activity of
WJTL is intrastate, appears directly at variance with the
many decisions, including the federal," 5 which hold that for
purposes of regulation all broadcasting, without exception,
is interstate commerce. The same point was in issue in a
104 178 Ga. 379, 173 S. E. 110 (1934), appeal dismissed, on motion of counsel for the appellant, on April 8, 1935 (295 U. S. 770).
105 Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622 (1885); Whitehurst v. Grimes, 21 Fed.
(2d) 787 (E. D. Ky. 1927); United States v. American Bond & Mortgage Co.,
31 Fed. (2d) 448 (N. D. Ii. 1929).
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case "' in the State of Washington. Here the Court granted
a permanent injunction restraining the Tax Commission of
the State of Washington and its members from collecting a
tax on the gross revenues of the broadcasting station provided in the State law. Both of these cases will provide interesting, helpful and significant decisions, which will have
a very important effect upon the problem now before us here.
It is indeed unfortunate that there is little prospect of any
early expression by the Supreme Court of the United States
on the question of defamation by radio. But that fact only
makes the need for legislation by Congress the more acute.
A federal statute controlling defamation by radi6, therefore,
stands as the only way in which the problem can be satisfactorily solved. It is interesting to note in passing that some
of the state legislators have written into their proposed regulatory statutes concerning radio that one of the penalties
for nonobservance of the statute will be to declare the broadcasting stations a nuisance and subsequently declare the
abatement of this nuisance by refusing to allow the station
to broadcast. Here again is a direct challenge to the paramount authority of the Federal Government which, alone,
possesses the authority both to revoke and issue broadcast
licenses. 10 7 Of course, we do not mean to deny completely
the right of state and municipal regulation of radio communication. In a new field of jurisprudence such as this there
is abundant occasion, however, for proceeding thoughtfully
and deliberately. This is especially true of radio regulation,
which must be based on a recognition of sound engineering
as well as legal principles. That this is not completely overlooked by those who have played an important part in
writing the early history of radio regulation is evident from
a statement made by a former general counsel of the Federal
Radio Commission: l08
106 Fisher's Blend Station v. Tax Commission of Washington, 45 Pac. (2d)
942 (Wash. 1935).
107 See: ComZuNicArioNs Acr or 1934, §§ 307 (a4), 308 (b), 311, 312 (1).
108 Statement made in May, 1929, by Bethuel M. Webster, Jr.
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"Since radio is a new art, there is hope for establishing a uniform
and scientific system of control. Transmission of intelligence by radio
is interstate commerce, and public interest requires congressional action to administer and to conserve the ether for the maximum benefit
of the people of the United States. In recognition of local interest, state
legislatures and the lesser bodies have framed laws imposing a measure
of control on radio transmission and reception and on the use of apparatus causing interference. Some of these measures are legitimate
and useful, falling well within the scope of the police power. Some
are clearly unconstitutional, since they interefere with federal regulation."

One of the most comprehensive studies of state and
municipal regulation of radio communication is that made
by Paul M. Segal and Paul D. P. Spearman," °9 of the Legal
Division of the Federal Radio Commission, in 1929. In this
publication they have shown the wide range of radio laws
enacted by states and municipalities by the following classification of some in effect at that time:
"I. Laws providing direct local control of radio transmission or
apparatus, such as those
A. Prescribing local licenses or privilege taxes;
B. Limiting the operation of reception apparatus;
C. Restricting the hours of transmission;
D. Dealing with the location of transmission equipment
1. To prevent the type of interference known as 'blanketing' (laws limiting the power output of transmitters);
2. To make zoning laws applicable to radio towers and
buildings;
E. Extending the state's control over public utilities to radio
transmission;
F. Concerning themselves with the subject-matter of radio
transmission.
"II. Antinuisance laws:
A. For the control of locally originating electrical interference
with radio reception;
B. For the control of loud-speaker operation.
"III. Laws dealing with apparatus construction:
A. As to towers, poles, guy wires, antennas, etc.;
B. As to wiring (fire hazards)."

It is to be noted that it is true that radio broadcasting
stations are licensed in "public interest, convenience and ne100 State and Municipal Regulation of Radio Communication (U. S.Government Printing Office, Washington, May, 1929, pp. 2, 3).
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cessity," a phrase borrowed by the Congress from public utility law, but it does not follow that the broadcasting station is
held out, either by itself or by the law, as a public utility for
the transmission of broadcasting. It is certainly charged with
a high degree of public responsibility so far as the reception
of broadcasting is concerned. When a radio program is broadcast by a station and it is picked up by numberless receiving
sets that program must be dedicated to the best interests of
the public. And unless the program is so arranged as to interest the public generally it must fail in its purpose. This is
the only public utility aspect that radio might possibly possess to our way of thinking and certainly does not bring it
under the general classification of a public utility. To hold
otherwise would be to invite numerous contradictory situations, impossible of reconciliation, but that may be properly
the subject for another paper and is not within my province
here, even though the public utility aspect of radio broadcasting will be later touched upon in connection with the
subject of censorship.
A valuable conclusion is drawn by the Messrs. Segal and
Spearman in the following language, which is of interest in
this connection:

11o

"The development of each of the major instrumentalities of interstate commerce in the United States has been accompanied by long
and expensive quarrels over the power to regulate them. Thousands of
ordinances have been enacted only to be found invalid or unwise. If
radio communication is now to traverse the same route, a vital element
in the national development will be handicapped. Radio by its physical
nature is the most nation-wide of all our commercial agencies. Equally
it is the most sensitive to regulation. The guiding principle of attempted local control should be extreme caution."

Extreme caution has not been the rule where local control
has been concerned however. In the field of defamation by
radio, particularly the state legislation has been noted for its
variety rather than for its consistency. As has already been
110 PAUL M. SEGAL AND PAuL D. P. SPEAnMAN, STATE AND MuNIciPAL RECULAT.oN or RADIO ComuNxicAToN (U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, May, 1929, p. 1S).
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noted, three states have provided for definite laws covering
defamation by radio. The California statute "I persists in
defining slander as follows:
"Slander is a malicious defamation, orally uttered, whether or not
it be communicated through or by radio or any mechanical or other
means or device whatsoever, tending to blacken the memory of one who
is dead, or to impeach the honesty, integrity, virtue or reputation, or
disclose the actual or alleged defects of one who is living, or of any
educational, literary, social, fraternal, benevolent or religious corporation, association or organization, and thereby to expose him or it to
public hatred, contempt, or ridicule. ..

."

The Statute then goes on to set the penalty for slander and
also concerns itself with the venues of criminal slander cases.
It is interesting to note that in the matter of venue,1 2 the
jurisdiction of a criminal action for slander which is uttered
into, or is communicated through or by any radio, or connected radios, or any other mechanical or other devices, is in
the county where the slander is so uttered, or in the county
wherein the person slandered resided, or the educational,
literary, social, fraternal, benevolent or religious corporation,
association or organization slandered was located at the time
of the utterance of the alleged slanderous words. If this same
concept of venue were introduced into the federal legislation
which ought to be passed, then the need for making this an
exclusive matter of federal control can not go by unchallenged.
The introduction of criminal liability and responsibility
for defamation by radio indicated that the states are recognizing by statute that the distinctions between libel and
slander, which always have been artificial, have been made
more so by the advent of radio broadcasting. The differences
in the rules of libel and slander have grown up on the theory
that more harm results from libel than from slander because
persons are liable to attach more weight to a written word,
and because there is a probability of a wider circulation as
111
112

GzN. LAws oF CAr. (Deering, Supp. 1929) § 258.
CAL. STATS. (1931), c. 87, § 784 (a).
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well as permanency, of the written word. There is a growing
tendency to ignore the distinctions between libel and slander,
to call them both defamation and to consider the circum13
stances only in the determination of damages and penalty.'
The Illinois Statute 114 has simplified legislation in this
field by merely extending by statute 'the already existing libel
law to broadcast defamation. Substantially the same is the
tenor of the Oregon Statute." 5 In Ohio a bill 116 defining and
providing a penalty for the publishing of libelous or slanderous matter by means of radio broadcasting, although not
comprehensive or very much in detail, demonstrated that its
Legislature was seriously considering this kind of legislation.
That particular Bill referred both to libel and slander and
provided a penalty of fine and imprisonment. A Kansas
slander bill," 7 making it a criminal offense to utter false or
defamatory remarks over the radio, was introduced by Representative Robb and met the same fate as the Ohio bill. In
New York an elaborate bill 11' was introduced in the Senate
by Mr. Hickey. This bill attempted ".to amend the penal law
in relation to slander by radio," rather than to libel by radio.
It is interesting to note in this Bill, Section 1357, that
"to sustain a charge of slander by radio, it is not necessary that the
matter complained of should have been seen by another. It is enough
that the defendant, having actual knowledge of such matter, personally
originated or disseminated such matter to the public by any means, or
that the defendant having actual knowledge of the contents thereof permitted such matter to be originated and disseminated to the public by
a radio operated and controlled by such defendant, provided, however,
that the provisions of this section shall apply only to matter originated
by the owner, operator, or one in control of such apparatus, and shall
not apply to matter obtained by or supplied to him from other sources."

The bill also provides in Section 1359 (a and b) for indictment for slander against both resident and nonresident, proDAVIS, LAW OF RAnIO CommINIcATjox, c. 10, p. 157.
114 ILL. REV. STAT. (Cahill, 1927), c. 38, p. 936.
115 Ore. Laws 1931, c. 366, p. 681.
116
SENATE 316, introduced by Senator Norton. Referred to the Committee
on the Judiciary. Favorably reported as amended. Killed in the Senate.
T17 House Bill No. 155.
118 Senate Bill No. 1886 (Introduced March 4, 1932).
114
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vided in the latter instance that an action for slander by
radio against a person not a resident of this State must be
found and tried in the county where the apparatus is located.
Minnesota1 1 9 and Texas 120 have proposed statutes covering
this question. According to a report in the Houston Chronicle of March 8, 1935, purchasers of radio time for political
speeches would be revealed to the public, under a bill introduced by Senator T. J. Holbrook, of Galveston, which is another innovation in the field of control of defamation by
radio.
Most recent of all this type of state legislation is that of
the State of Washington where a bill 121 introduced by Representative Donald A. McDonald, of King County, makes
a speaker guilty of libel who exposes a person to "hatred,
contempt, ridicule or deprives him of the benefit of public
confidence." Referring to the bill, Representative McDonald 122 says:
"After receiving scores of protests from radio listeners asking that
something be done to free the air of slander and vituperation I introduced this bill. Radio speakers are constantly making statements that
no newspaper can legally print, even if they desired. We must and will
clear the air of slanderous attacks on reputable citizens."
A perusal of the state statutes which have been introduced
above must present, even to the casual observer, a striking
lack of uniformity of intent, purpose, venue and punishment.
Yet we have only a few of the states represented. Let it be
pointed out here and made a feature of special note that even
though control of defamation by radio has been left, up to
the time of writing this article, to the individual states, only
three of them have succeeded in affixing any kind of definite
legislation to their statute books. In all of the proposed state
legislation and in all of the actual statutes there is no semi9 Senate Bill 588 (Providing punishment for slander by radio).
120

slander).
121
122

21, 1935.

House Bill No. 326 (Defining and providing punishment for radio
House Bill No. 531 (Introduced February 21, 1935).
Report of Lester M. Hunt, in the Seattle Post-Intelligencer, February
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blance of uniformity. It is also to be noted here that the
states have not legislated in this respect because there was
a lack of need for such legislation. Indeed, a summary of the
cases of defamation by radio which have been before the
courts of the states and which are widely scattered, both as
to territory and final determination, demonstrate that the
need of control of defamation by radio is of paramount importance, so that the percentage of three states out of fortyeight, which is admittedly not encouraging, need not be discouraging to us in our attempt to secure for the Federal Government the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction of defamation by radio.
NATURE OF DEFAMATION

By RADIO

Another thing which has been shown by a study of the proposed and actual state statutes and the cases which have
been decided in -the state courts is the surprising failure of
all of 'them to agree unanimously on whether defamation by
radio is libel or slander. Radio broadcasting is, to be sure, a
new implement for the ancient art of defamation which men
have used in the past and will continue to use in the future.
Courts and legislators will be faced with the problem of determining unusual questions in this respect. While the differences between libel and slander must ever remain, both
as to the common law and statutory law, as has been shown
in another part of this article, yet that is no reason why we
should adhere to and insist upon the fundamental element in
libel, to be done by adhering to this fundamental distinction
was to punish for the wider diffusion and the more serious
damage incurred by written defamation over the less serious
oral defamation. Radio has quite overcome this distinction.
If further argument were needed we might proceed on the
theory, held by all text writers,12 3 that the oral reading of
written libelous matter is itself a libel. After all, many of
the rules of the law of libel are illogical and arbitrary, and
128 See, for instance, ODGERs, Lm,

AN

SLrDER (4th ed.) 151.
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there seems to be no good reason why they should continue
to be perpetrated and perpetuated.
Professor Vold 12 has built up a strong argument for his

highly tenable thesis that the underlying basis for liability
is the law of defamation and not the law of negligence, introducing a logical trend of thought, a line of reasoning
which is sure to make itself felt as the law of this important
subject continues to develop.
It has been held that the simplest and best method of considering defamation was to abolish at once the distinction between libel and slander, and assimilate the law of slander
to that of libel.' 25 In overruling a demurrer to a complaint
seeking to hold a radio broadcasting station for publication
of libelous statements, a trial court, 12 1 in Spokane, Washington, answered as follows the contention that language broadcast over the microphone was slander rather than libel:
"If it is written or printed, it has more harmful effects upon the
person concerned and it carries with it the inference of deliberation and
preparation. Everybody knows that when they hear a statement over
the air that statement is not an extemporaneous affair, that it is a
prepared statement and that it represents deliberation and reflection
and preparation of the announcer or person who has submitted it for
broadcasting. It undoubtedly must be true, then, that we will have to
regard the prepared statement submitted to the radio company for
publication over the radio in the same category with a libel. I don't
see how it can be regarded otherwise."

Attention is sometimes given to the general doctrine of
"no liability without fault," in this connection, a doctrine
which always permits the actor, if careful to throw the risks
of his activity on his neighbors while he personally disclaims
responsibility. This phase of liability has been discussed comprehensively in a number of scholarly articles," 7 which lead
J. RADio L. (1932) 673 et seq.
Van Vechten Veeder, History and Theory of the Law of Defamation (11)
4 CoL. L. R.v. 33, 54.
126 Miles v. Wasmer (Unreported. Decided in the Superior Court of the
State of Washington for the County of Spokane. Discussed in 3 J. RADo L. 161,
124 Void, Defamation by Radio, 2
125

162).
127 See 2

J.

RA,.o

L. (1932) 687.
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to the conclusion that historically the reverse of "no liability
without fault" is more nearly true. Some very recent cases
on rather novel fact situations have frankly relied on that
historical position as the general rule of tort liability.12 But
the doctrine can not fairly apply to defamation by radio.
In general, the legislative proposals that have been introduced are based on the statutes applying to newspaper publication.129 In some instances existing laws applying to newspapers would simply be amended by adding such a phrase as
"or by radio broadcast." In practically every instance there
is a clear assumption that newspaper publication and broadcasting are closely parallel. Every student of the law is painfully aware of the truth of the axiom, "All analogies in the
law are dangerous." Yet there is a similarity between defamation by newspapers and defamation by radio in spite
of the fact that some hold that the parallel breaks down at
several points along the line. Let us examine into the analogy
to conclude definitely that the comparison is fairly taken.
The law is well-settled that the publisher of false and defamatory utterances is liable at his peril to the victim whose
reputation is injured thereby.!"0 In the Peck v. Tribune
Co.1 ' Justice Holmes, of fond memory, said:
"If the publication was libelous, the defendant took the risk. As was
said of such matters by Lord Mansfield, 'Whenever a man publishes, he
publishes at his peril.'... The reason is plain. A libel is harmful on its
face. If a man sees fit to publish manifestly hurtful statements concerning an individual ... the usual principles of tort will make him
liable if the statements are false ......

Mistakes, no matter what their origin or their reason for
being present, afford no excuse. Even as between a nonnegli128 Green v. General Petroleum Corporation, 270 Pac. (Cal. 1928) 52; Sussex Land & Live Stock Co. v. Midwest Refining Co., 294 Fed. 597 (C. C. A. 8th,

1923).

129 Bellows, The Threat of Libel and Slander Laws (1935) 8 BitoA c"ao
MAGAZ E, at p. 17.
180 Taylor v. Hearst, 107 Cal. 262, 40 Pac. 392 (1895); Sweet v. Post Pub.
Co., 215 Mass. 450, 102 N. E. 660 (1913); Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U. S. 185

(1909).
181

Op. cit. supra note 130.
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gent publisher and his passive innocent victim, the law unhesitatingly places the risk of unprivileged defamation by
publication upon the active publisher and not upon his passive victim.' 32 All this is based on the theory that he whose
activity creates the risks and who derives the benefits therefrom, must also bear its burdens. The absolute burden has
evidently not been too great, for great newspapers the length
and breadth of the land in which this law exists continue to
thrive and flourish. The same rule seems applicable to radio
broadcasting for if the risk of uncensored defamation of innocent victims is greater in the business of ordinary radio
broadcasting than it is in the business of newspaper publication, the general public should have greater and not less protection against ,being further victimized. And radio stations
are commercially minded, let there be no mistake of that
fact, and they sell time the same as newspapers and other
publications sell space for advertising revenues. It is claimed,
with strong reason, that there is complete control of the publisher in both cases and that the broadcasting station publishes or participates in the act of publication quite as effectually as does the newspaper.'
Active, joint participation of both the speaker and the
broadcaster is evident from an understanding of the technique of broadcasting,"" as explained in this language:
"In the usual radio transmission there are two parties, the speaker
and the broadcaster. If the matter transmitted be defamatory, two
must cooperate to create the harm. No other system parallels it. The
utterance of the speaker does not leave the studio until transmitted by
the operations of the station owner. They must act in concert to complete the publication."
In order not to unduly confuse the analysis here, let us be
reminded that what is being written here is an exemplification of abundant reason for saying that a person or persons
who defame by radio actually do publish; also, that there is
132 Walker v. Bee-News Pub. Co., 240 N. W. 579 (Neb. 1932).
183 Vold, Defamation by Radio (1932) 2 J. RArIo L. 679.
184
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a joint liability of the speaker and the broadcaster, as is
evident from the nature of their close association. Both of
these things must be kept in mind during this phase of the
discussion if we are to clearly understand the issue.
In considering this question, we can not escape the broad
principle that as to all defamation, all persons are liable in
law who are liable in fact. We must be mindful also of the
principle that "all who assist in publication are liable." I'l
The principle that all aiders and abetters are liable also is
inescapable.' The familiar saying, "tale-bearers are as bad
as tale-makers," is exemplified in the classic lines of Mrs.
Can and Sir Pet,"3 7 repeated here as apropos of the subject:
"Mrs. Can.
"Sir Pet.

But surely you would not be quite so severe on those
who only repeat what they hear?
Yes, Madam, I would have law merchant for them
too; and in all cases of slander currency whenever
the drawer of the lie was not to be found, the injured
parties should have a right to come on any of the indorsers."

Broadcasters are "indorsers of the scandal" whidh the speak-

er pours into the microphone. The broadcaster operating the
broadcasting station actively participates with the speaker
at the microphone in the publication of the utterances broadcast. While the speaker utters his words into the station's
microphone, the station's operators must be actively concerned in carrying out the processes by which the words so
uttered by the speaker into the microphone are broadcast
to the listening public."8' Switches provided at the microphone and at various other places in the physical equipment
of the broadcasting apparatus always enable the station to
shut off the broadcasts if libelous matter is used by the
speaker. Thus could the station save itself harmless from
liability for such defamation.
135 1
186
137

188

STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LTABInTn 298.
Tucker v. Eatough, 186 N. C. 544, 120 S. E. 57 (1923).
Richard Brinsley Sheridan's celebrated play, "The School for Scandal."
See 54 A. B. A. REP. 414.
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The burden of protecting itself from liability for defamation rests squarely upon the broadcasting station and not
upon anyone else. Commercially-minded radio broadcasting,
which has become more powerful and gigantic even than
newspapers, 13 9 seems hardly to be in dire need of any favors
or concessions in order to permit the industry to prosper.
Without relaxation of the law of defamation in their favor,
broadcast stations continue to thrive. The demand for station licenses becomes ever greater. In making this statement
there is no show of hostility to prosperous broadcast businesses (also a popular habit of the day). It is simply a question on our part of comparative justice and of placing the
responsibility squarely where it seems most justly to rest.
Assuming any other theory would be fraught with pernicious
consequences inimical to the general welfare and would become a monstrous injustice.
Broadcasters set up an imposing defense to this line of
argument, showing numerous instances in which the newspaper analogy breaks down. They admit that many programs
are prepared with the active cooperation of the station staff
and admit in such cases that the newspaper parallel is close.
But they disclaim any liability for responsibility for defamation which might occur in the course of a public events broadcast, where the broadcaster is almost invariably unable to
know in advance what is going to be said. But the person
defamed has no way of knowing either what is going to be
said. He can not arrest the libel before it occurs. He deserves
'39
The Crosley Radio Corporation of Cincinnati spent approximately
$500,000 for a 500,000-watt transmitter, even though they were given only an
experimental authorization to use that great power. The right to use it was subsequently materially revoked, following a protest against use of that great power
by Canadian stations. See Crosley Radio Corp. v. Federal Communications Commission, in United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
Journal Co. v. Federal Radio Commission, 48 Fed. (2d) 461 (App. D. C.
1931). This case brought out fact that the station investment exceeded $300,000.
Gross annual operation costs amounted to the same sum.
Great Lakes Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Radio Commission, 37 Fed. (2d) 993
(App. D. C. 1930). This case brought out fact that the station investment exceeded $450,000. Gross annual operation cost was over $300,000.
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this measure of protection, this grasp upon those who manage and operate the agencies which are the means of spreading the defamation and of publishing it to ears that would,
but for that activity, never hear the libel.
It is also argued,"" and admittedly with a great deal of
popular sympathy, that any speaker over radio may at any
moment deviate from his prepared manuscript. Says Dr.
Bellows:
"A defamatory statement may be uttered even though the broadcaster has taken every possible precaution to see in advance a copy of
what he expects the speaker to say. Since a defamatory statement can
be uttered in two or three seconds, the control operator, even if he has
strict instructions to switch off the speaker instantly on any deviation
from the prepared text, can not always do so before mischief is done.
"If the states enact legislation of the general type now under consideration, the only possible result will be that broadcasters must refuse to allow the use of their facilities in practically all cases where
they cannot be absolutely sure in advance as to just what is going to
be said. Since broadcasts of this type are precisely the ones most valuable and interesting to the public, it is clear that the public would be
the principal loser if such a policy had to be adopted. The remedy for
such a situation appears to lie in framing state legislation to provide
that broadcasters shall not be liable, either in criminal or in civil action, in the case of broadcasts over which he can have no adeqiate
control."

Dr. Bellows suggests this specific proviso for such contemplated legislation:
"Provided, That no broadcasting station shall be held liable in the
case of any defamatory statement uttered by or on behalf of any candidate for public office when such speech falls within the scope of Section 315 of the Communications Act of 1934, nor in the case of any
such statement made in any program wherein the broadcasting station
cannot, by the exercise of reasonable care, know in advance what is
to be said and thus prevent such utterance." 141

Attention is called to several points raised by Dr. Bellows'
proposals. In the first place, he has not suggested that this
provision be made the subject of federal legislation. If it is
140 Bellows, Threat of Libel and Slander Laws (1935) 8 BROADCAStIG MAGAzIn, at p. 17.
. 141 Section 31S of the Communications Act of 1934 will he discussed in another connection later in this article. See footnote 179, infra.
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at all worthy and if the Federal Government possesses the
authority to act in this respect, as it clearly does, why not
concentrate on one single statute rather than attempt to have
this provision enacted into 48 separate state codes? In my
opinion the proposal here made is not a happy one, because
it proceeds from a biased viewpoint and because it attempts
to protect the broadcaster from liability which must squarely rest upon his shoulders if we are to take any precaution
to protect the general public from allowing the broadcaster
to make a noxious use of an instrumentality of commerce
which has been entrusted to him by virtue of a federal
license.
As to the argument that the control operator can not always shut off the defamatory statements before the message
is done, practical demonstration of the operation of a radio
station shows that this can be accomplished within a surprisingly short time; but even suppose that it would be imr
possible for the operator so to act, there is another way in
which the broadcaster can protect himself, a method, it is
noted, which he has already pursued, namely, to protect
himself by special contract with the person speaking over
the facilities, thereby enabling him, the broadcaster, to transfer, by this special contract, the liability or, at least, the responsibility for the payment of whatever damages that might
result from such defamation over his facilities. The following
14 2
provision is quoted as indicative of this point:
"The witnesses agree to save the broadcaster harmless against any
claims or liability for libel, slander, or infringement of copyrights, or

any other demand of any kind whatsoever, brought, claimed, or charged,
directly or indirectly, by reason of broadcaster's rendering service in
accordance with agreement. It is agreed that nothing will be broadcast
in violation of any law or regulation promulgated by any due governmental authority, particularly with reference to libel and slander."

It is evident from this that the broadcaster has two safeguards namely, shutting off the defamatory matter by phys142 This clause is to be found in standard contracts used by the leading
broadcasting companies.
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ical control of the facilities over which the defamation is
attempted to be broadcast, and protecting himself from liability by a contract should the defamation be broadcast over
his facilities without his being able to prevent such broadcast by actual physical control. It is suggested, also, that insurance against this risk might be taken for such protection,
and it is available to him just as it is available to newspapers
and other publications. On the one hand, then, we have -the
broadcaster with all his vast apparatus and facilities having
actively participated in defamation by radio hedged about
and protected not alone by the financial resources which the
operation of a successful business makes possible for hiring
competent legal counsel and for taking other means of protecting himself against payment of damages, but also hedged
in and protected by other means of escaping payment of
damages as I have indicated above. On the other hand, we
have the person or persons who is or are defamed by the
radio broadcaster, alone and unprotected, without any means
of knowing or controlling what is to be broadcast, without
any way of effectively striking back or effacing the defamation placed against him or them, and with no way of holding
the broadcaster or the speaker, or both, in the absence of any
specific and sufficient federal legislation or well-defined body
of court determinations which might constitute any substantial body of case law. The inequality here and the injustice
of the present situation can not help but convince any fairminded person that federal control of defamation by radio
is the only rational method of correcting this obnoxious situation.
It is also to be noted here, as further exemplification of
the inequality between the position of the broadcaster and
the injured party where defamation by radio is concerned,
that the person defamed is,
without any tangible proof of
the exact nature of the matter broadcast, since broadcasters
are neither required to keep stenographic nor mechanical
transcriptions of material broadcast. The laws of evidence
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meet the problem partly, but do not provide an entirely satisfactory solution. It would appear that rules for the operation of broadcast stations might be further fortified by
amendment so as to require broadcasters to keep available
a record of material broadcast, at least of advertising continuities, public speeches, political propaganda, and other
matter vhich might appear to contain logically matter which
could easily become defamatory.
Argument for relaxing the rule of absolute liability to
which the broadcaster should be held is sometimes attempted by resort to comparison to the liability which a telephone
company incurs when a slander is published over its facilities. The comparison is not valid, however, because the telephone, as ordinarily operated, is a purely mechanical device
so that the agents of the telephone company do not cooperate in any way. With the automatic switchboard and dial
system there is not even the necessity for a control operator
to make the connection with the person. The situation is exactly the reverse in so far as the broadcasting company is
concerned. Again the telephone transmits a message only
from one individual to another, whereas in broadcasting the
message which the speaker utters into the microphone is actively published by the broadcaster to many listeners. This
further defeats the argument with respect to telephone companies.
The same is true of an analogy of radio broadcasting to
the modification of the rule of absolute liability enjoyed by
telegraph companies. Three interesting cases trace the origin
of the exemption of good faith and reasonable care which
telegraph companies now enjoy. In the first case 1' the court
said:
"....

it is certain that no telegraph company can assume to act as a

censor as to the language of messages, or the purpose they are intended
to accomplish, yet as a common carrier of persons, though bound to
carry everyone who pays the fare, may exclude from his vehicle a per148 Nye v. Western Union Tel. Co., 104 Fed. 628 (C. C. D. Minn. 1900).
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son having a loathsome, contagious disease, so, equally, it would be
the right and duty of a telegraph company to refuse to transmit a message which upon its face is obscene, profane, or clearly libelous and
manifestly intended only for the purpose of defamation .... Having
no duty of censorship, or right to catechise the censor, if he acts in
good faith, and the language of the message is such that a person of
ordinary intelligence, knowing nothing of the parties or circumstances,
would not necessarily conclude that defamation was the object and
purpose of the message, it would be his duty to send it, and for his
performance of -thatduty the telegraph company would incur no responsibility."

Another case 144 holds that
"Where a proffered message is not manifestly a libel, or susceptible
of a libelous meaning, on its face, and is forwarded in good faith by the
operator, the defendant can not be held to have maliciously published
a libel, although the message subsequently proves to be such in fact.
In such case the operator can not wait to consult a lawyer, or forward
the message to the principal office for instructions. He must decide
promptly, and forward the message without delay if it is a proper
one, and for any honest error of good judgment in the premises the
telegraph company can not be held responsible."

Yet a third case 14 gave further weight to this same line
of reasoning.
"The company has no right to receive and transmit libelous messages. Its agents are limited in the same way. Like other common carriers, the telegraph company is bound to care and diligence in carrying on its business and to take reasonable care, at least, not to injure
others. If a message offered for transmission is anonymous or is libelous on its face, it should not be received and transmitted. The company should so instruct its agents, and the agents should so act."

To attempt to hold a brief for the broadcasters on this
same ground and to extend to them the same exemption for
good faith and reasonable care becomes an impossibility
when we regard the fact that under the Communications
Act of 1934 146 it is specifically declared that radio is not a
public utility or a common carrier and that it does not have
the responsibility of serving all who present themselves and
properly demand service. It is there in the identical position
Peterson v. Western Union Tel. Co., 67 N. W. 646 (Minn. 1896).
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Cashman, 149 Fed. 367 (C. C. A. Sth,
1906). See, also, 20 CoL. L. REv. 30, at p. 369.
146 § 3 (h).
144
145
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with a newspaper which may or may not publish as it
chooses."4 7 We must apply the general rule that the voluntary publisher assumes the absolute risk for that which is
published.
As to the question of agency, no situations are possible of
conjecture which would not be covered by the same doctrine
I have outlined here. If the owner of the broadcast station
uses his own facilities for the broadcast, manifestly he would
be liable. If he employs another to speak for him, he would
be responsible on the ground that the principal is responsible
for the wilful or malicious defamation by his agent or employee acting within the scope of his authority. 4 ' Thus is
placed on the broadcaster the burden of choosing responsible
assistants to help in the conduct of the broadcasting, those
who can be relied upon not to incur additional liability for
the principal. If the facilities are loaned or leased or rented
to others, there would be no relaxation of the rule of absolute liability either, in my opinion, nor could liability be escaped on the ground that the party or parties using the facilities are independent contractors and are responsible for the
defamation. A joint liability, in the interest of the general
welfare, must be held to exist in such situation. As has been
suggested above, protection from liability for defamation
under such a situation is best provided for by having the
broadcaster taking the precaution of arranging a special contract whereby the user of the broadcast facilities, no matter
what the contract for the use might be, assumes liability for
all damages which might result from the use thereof as might
be the rule followed in any number of similar situations in
our commercial life today.
VENUE

The scope of this particular article does not admit of extended discussion of the question of venue for criminal and
147
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civil liability for defamation by radio. This would await determination by specific federal legislation. Certainly it raises
intriguing questions and since the questions which are raised
but point the clearer to the necessity for federal rather than
state regulations I can not resist the opportunity of discussing the question briefly here. It is apparent that one radio
broadcast may create both civil and criminal liability in one
or more states, since such defamation broadcast is actually
or might possibly be heard in one or several states. The
question becomes even more pressing when we consider that
if defamation occurred during a so-called coast-to-coast network broadcast it would be entirely possible to have liability
in all of the states since the essence of the action for defamation is publication and since publication was made in all of
the states. Holding the station and the speaker jointly liable
for the resulting damage would make it practically essential
that regulation in this field be confided to the Federal Government.
Reverting to the newspaper analogy to substantiate this
claim, the Supreme Court of Washington, 49 in an interesting opinion, held that a proprietor of a paper published in
California and circulated in the State of Washington was
subject to criminal liability in Washington for any libelous
matter so published, the court saying specifically, that
"If a person residing without the State publishes a libel against a
citizen of the State and circulated such libel within the State, he is as
much subject to punishment within the State as any citizen of the

State. The mere fact that he resides outside of the State and publishes
the libel outside of the State is no excuse for a violation of the law of
the State. . . There can be no doubt of the power of the State to
prosecute a nonresident of the State who commits a crime against the

law of the State by shooting across the line, or by causing a nuisance
in a stream running from one State into another which results in injury

to this State. The publishing of a libel stands on exactly the same footing."

It is -my opinion that defamation by radio also stands upon
the same footing.
149 State v. Piver, 132 Pac. 858 (Wash. 1913).
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By the general federal statute of venue,1 5 the venue of

civil suits in the United States District Court shall be (1)
when jurisdiction is based solely on the fact that the suit is
between citizens of different states, the district of the residence of either the plaintiff or the defendant; (2) when
jurisdiction may be based on any other ground, the district
of the residence of the defendant.
Venue in criminal cases is controlled by the Federal Constitution 151 which provides that federal criminal cases must
be tried in the state and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed. Under the Federal Judicial Code the trial
of crimes begun in one district and completed in another district may be in either district. 52
Congress, by special statutes, has prescribed the venue in
certain classes of cases, thus taking these particular cases
from the operation of the general venue statute as, for instance, in patent cases, cases under the anti-trust acts, etc.153
Whether venue in cases arising under the proposed federal
statute for control of defamation by radio should be the
same as the established venue in civil and criminal cases or
whether the venue should fall within the special provisions
such as Congress has made in the past, rests upon the wisdom of the legislators who will have the responsibility for
framing and enacting this proposed legislation.
CENSORSHIP
We can not hope to have covered fully the question of
control of defamation by radio until we have settled once
and for all the vexatious question of censorship. Broadcasters raise their hands in holy horror at provisions of the law
which they say specifically demand that they permit certain
broadcasts over the air and at the same time hold them
150 28 U. S. C. A. § 112.
151 U. S. Const., Art. IH, § 2, par. 3.
152 28 U. S. C. A. § 103.
158 See Domn, FWznAL PRocrman 476-518.
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responsible for liability for broadcasts which they are required to present. Again, legislators are awed with the imposing argument that to write any kind of federal legislation for control of defamation by radio is to invest immediately the regulating body with powers of censorship which
will at once become a menace to freedom of speech and to
the fulfillment of the true function of radio in a community.
If progress toward our ultimate goal is ever to be made, it
must be clearly and unquestionably demonstrated that such
proposed legislation does not permit or smack of censorship
in any sense of the word. When that fact is clearly shown
and understood we will proceed toward an orderly solution
of this pressing problem.
Let us begin by determining the origin and definition of
a censor, since censorship implies the existence of a censor.
Historically, a censor was one of two magistrates of Rome
who took a register of the number and property of citizens,
and who also exercised the office of inspector of morals and
conduct." A censor was also defined to be one who acts as
an overseer of morals and conduct; an official empowered to
examine written or printed matter as manuscripts of books,
plays, foreign newspapers or magazines, etc., in order to forbid publication, circulation, or representation if containing
anything objectionable. Censorship is defined to be the office, power or action of a censor; as to stand for a censorship. It is to be clearly understood at the outset that neither
the Federal Radio Commission ...nor its successor, the Federal Communications Commission,1 56 had or has any powers
of censorship. In fact, they are specifically prohibited from
exercising any degree of censorship. Liberty of expression is
one of man's richest inheritances, "the most valuable
achievement of modem civilization, and as a condition of
social progress it should be deemed fundamental." 157
154
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Radio Act of 1927, § 29.
Communications Act of 1934, § 326.
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The constitutional provision in respect to freedom of

speech and liberty of expression has been defended often by
the Supreme Court, but nowhere in more striking language
than that used by Chief Justice Hughes,158 when he said that
"In determining the extent of the constitutional protection it has
generally, if not universally, been considered that it is the chief purpose
of the guaranty to prevent previous restraints upon publication ....

the

preliminary freedom extends as well to the false as to the true; the
subsequent punishment may extend as well to the true as to the false.
. . . The exceptional nature of its limitations places in a strong light

the general conception that liberty of the press, historically considered
and taken up by the Federal Constitution, has meant, principally, although not exclusively, immunity from previous restraints or censorship."

The same sentiments have been expressed by Blackstone 159

in this language:
"This liberty when rightly understood, consists in laying no previous
restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for
criminal matter when published. Every free man has an undoubted
right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid
this is to destroy the freedom of the press; but if he publishes what
is improper, mischievous, or illegal, he must take the consequences of
his own temerity."

Thus is expressed the sentiment that a policy of leaving to

correction by subsequent punishment those utterances or
publications contrary to the public welfare is, after all, the
best policy.160
In discussing censorship we must always have before us
the problem of whether to choose previous restraint or subsequent punishment. Previous restraint of the press may be
defined to be any form of governmental interference which
operates to prevent publication without advance government approval either of the publisher himself or of the matter to be published, or to suppress further publication beNear v. Minnesota ex tel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697 (1931).
1 BL. CoMm. 152-153.
160 KFKB Broadcasting Ass'n v. Federal Radio Commission, 47 Fed. (2d)
670 (App. D. C. 1931). See, also, Trinity Methodist Church, South, v. Fed.
Radio Comm'n, 62 Fed. (2d) 850 (App. D. C. 1932), petition for certioraridenied,
284 U. S. 685 (1932), rehearing denied, 288 U. S. 599 (1933).
158

159
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cause of matter previously published which does not meet
with the approval of the government. Subsequent punishment is that form of government interference which operates to prevent publication solely through fear of consequences in the form of penalties, civil damages, or deprivation of some right or privilege.'61
The Supreme Court has struck out viciously at previous
restraint upon publication,' 62 and Mr. Caldwell

163

claims

that the refusal of the Federal Communications Commission
to renew a license or to refuse. applications for improving the
facilities or by subjecting the offending licensee to inferior
facilities and possibly also by revocation of license,"' all
tend to operate and have the effect of a, previous restraint
even though appearing under the guise of a subsequent punishment. However, the record of the Commission in this respect has been confined only to the clear-cut cases of stations which were manifestly not operating to serve the public interest, convenience, and necessity, and the federal
courts to which appeals were taken have upheld the decisions
of the Commission in this respect with a surprising consistency.165
It has been held, and by responsible judicial authorities, 6
that free speech is not an absolute right under the Constitution of the United States, either under the First or the
Fourth Amendment or any other amendment. Again, it was
said by the United States Supreme Court 117 that "the First
Amendment of the Constitution, while prohibiting legisla161 Caldwell, Freedom of Speech and Radio Broadcasting,ANNAzs.or Tu
Ama=CAN AcnADmy OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ScIENCE, Vol. 77 (January, 1935).
162 Near v. MIinnesota ex rel. Olson, op. cit. supra note 158.
163 Caldwell, op. cit. supra note 161.
164 All are possible under the powers granted the Commission, under the
Communications Act of 1934.
165 KFKB Broadcasting Ass'n v. Federal Radio Commission, op. cit. supra
note 160; Trinity Methodist Church, South, v. Fed. Radio Com., op. cit. sttpra
note 160.
166 Mutual Film Corporation v. City of Chicago, 224 Fed. 101 (C. C. A.
7th, 1915).
167 Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U. S.204 (1919).
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tion against free speech, as such, can not have been, and obviously was not, intended to give immunity for every possible use of language." In at least one important case the
same court upheld the right for film censors to examine, inspect and scrutinize all films prior to their exhibition and
held that examination and approval are conditions which
must be met before and are prerequisites to exhibition.' 6 8
Certainly I do not intend to suggest, by giving these citations, that the federal control of defamation by radio should
lead to previous restraint of any kind, for such a provision
is fatal to the inalienable right of freedom of speech and
liberty of expression. But neither do I wish to go to the
other extreme and allow unbridled speech over the radio
to be made the instrument of incalculable damage and injury to innocent, unprotected citizens, for such would be a
mockery upon the social principles of the guarantee of free
speech. There will be no attempt to go to either of these extremes. Any proposed legislation should most assuredly not
take for its premise the enjoining of slander or libel by radio
because to do so "would constitute a deprivation of one's
constitutional right to have the question of liability decided
by a jury and would be incompatible with the responsibility
clauses of the various constitutional guarantees." 169 Examination of the authorities makes it apparent that it is unconstitutional to enjoin slander or libel.' Many cases hold that
equity will not enjoin defamation because it has no jurisdic-

tion to do

171

so.

My recommendation for federal control of defamation
would reserve to the courts rather than to an administrative
168 Mutual Film Corporation of Missouri v. Hodges, 236 U. S. 248 (1915).
See, also: Warren v. United States, 183 Fed. 718 (C. C. A. 8th, 1910); Clark v.
United States, 211 Fed. 916 (C. C. A. 8th, 1914).
169 Caldwell, Censorship of Radio Programs (1931) 1 J. RADIo L. 457.
170 C. R. Miller Mfg. Co. v. Rogers, 281 S. W. 596 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926);
Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S.418 (1911); Willis v. O'Connell,
231 Fed. 1004 (S.D. Ala. 1916).
171 Francis v. Flynn, 118 U. S. 385 (1886). See, also: Ex parte Rapier, 143
U. S. 110, 133 (1892); Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U. S. 288 (1913).
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body the determination of what is defamatory under the law
which will define defamation by radio. It should provide, in
so far as is humanly possible, complete guarantees against
any type of censorship. "So anomalous is the cry of 'censorship' that a recent commentator while condemning practically every inhibition placed on program material by the Commission and the courts, nevertheless, declares that 'Some sort
of censorship is really implicit in the situation.' Complete
freedom of the air, in any sense parallel to freedom of the
press, is at present impossible because of the physical limitations upon the number of wave lengths or broadcasting channels which can be used simultaneously without interference.
Almost all of the difficulties that bedevil the members of the
2
Federal Radio Commission arise out of this basic fact." 1'
Other interesting quotations illustrate the same point:
"The free speech secured federally by the First Amendment means
complete immunity for the publication by speech or print of whatever
is not harmful in character, when tested by such standards as the law
affords. . . . Legal talk-liberty never has meant, however, 'the unrestricted right to say what one pleases at all times and under all circumstances.'" 178
"It is a fundamental principle, long established, that the freedom
of speech and of the press which is secured, by the Constitution does
not confer an absolute right to speak o'r publish, without responsibility,
whatever one may choose, or an unrestricted and unbridled license, that
gives immunity for every possible use of language, and prevents the
punishment of those who abuse this freedom." 174
"I am far from intending that these authorities mean, by freedom
of the press, a press wholly beyond the reach of the law, for this would
be emphatically Pandora's box, the source of every evil.... The founders of our government were too wise and too just ever to have intended,
by the freedom of the press, a right to circulate falsehood as well as
truth, or that the press should be the lawful vehicle of malicious defamation, or an engine for evil and designing men, to cherish, for mischievous purposes, sedition, irreligion and impurity. . . .I-adopt, in
this case, as perfectly correct, the comprehensive and accurate definition of one of the counsel at the bar (Gen. Hamilton), that the liberty
of the press consists in the right to publish, with impunity, truth, with
172 Dawson, in "The American Mercury," March, 1934.
178 Fraina v. United States, 255 Fed. 28, 35 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918).
174 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652 (1925).
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good motives, and for justifiable ends, whether it respects government,
magistracy, or individuals." 175

That a sizable group of representative Americans feel that
some sort of radio censorship would be a wholesome thing
and not much to be feared is apparent from expressions in
the public print of leading men of the United States. Thus
Cardinal O'Connell,' 7" of Boston, asserted recently that some
definite form of censorship by radio was needed. "Undoubtedly a time will come," said the Cardinal, "when men with
particular ideas can not command the air and attempt to impress those ideas upon others. I see no reason why men with
axes to grind, with schemes back in their heads which they
are not frank enough to reveal should be allowed to go on theair and scream and battle and belabor each other. To my
mind a modified form of censorship must come." To provide
this modified form of censorship, Cardinal O'Connell suggests a commission of responsible and honorable men, nonpartisan, and yet able to detect behind what seems to be a
plausible speech a clever hiding of fantastic ideas.
In order that this present discussion may not appear to
give expression to a desire for even a modified sense of censorship to control defamation by radio, I wish it to be clearly
understood that Cardinal O'Connell's statement is introduced merely to show trends of thought among American
leaders. His suggestion appears to be primarily an occasion
on which he has attempted to choose the lesser of two evils.
Much discussion has arisen in this connection over a section 177 of the Communications Act which provides that any

licensee shall permit equal opportunities to candidates for
public office to use a broadcasting station and that such
licensee shall have no power of censorship over the material
broadcast. Broadcasters seize upon this Section of the Act
as an example of how the analogy between newspaper pub175

176
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People v. Croswell, 3 John. Cas. 337, 393 (1804).
New York Times (March 22, 1935).
Communications Act of 1934, § 315.
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lication and radio broadcasting breaks down completely,
claiming that one can easily imagine the outcry that would
arise from newspapers if they should be required by a federal
law to publish complete and unedited the speech of every
political candidate if they gave space to any political speeches at all. But they have not approached the problem in a
logical way and their objections here are completely unfounded. When broadcasters claim that under the law they
are compelled to permit the speech and under the same law
are given no power of censorship and hence that they should
not be liable for broadcasting something that they are required by law to broadcast, they are distorting the facts, to
put it mildly. There was no such intention in the minds of
the legislators to establish such a confusing situation. The
Section purposely says nothing about giving the broadcast
station any privilege to utter defamation. The legislators try
to protect the public interest in this respect rather than to
serve the private interests of the broadcasters. If a radio
station were given a mandate to broadcast everything which
every politician might wish to pour into the microphone, then
logically a privilege might be claimed. But as a matter of
fact, broadcasting stations do not need to publish any political broadcasts, either under this Section of the Act or under
the section 178 which says that broadcasting is not a common
carrier. The analogy between broadcasting and newspaper
publication is, if anything, stronger here than at any other
point. Let us examine the facts closely to discover the validity of this analogy.
Newspapers are not required to publish everything submitted to them for publication. In their own interest and in
the interest of the public welfare they exercise what has
been advantageously termed an "editorial selection." 179 This
is a type of private censorship, if you desire to call it such,
178 Communications Act of 1934, § 3 (h).
179 The term was used by Dr. Henry A. Bellows, in hearings held before the
House Committee on Merchant Marine, Radio and Fisheries, in 1933, on H. R.
7986, 73d Cong., 2nd Sess. 158.
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a censorship which a newspaper exercises in order to serve
good taste and to preserve itself against liability for defamatory or objectional material which might otherwise be
published. If a newspaper does undertake to publish political
propaganda which is fraught with the possibility of defamation, it takes the precaution to provide by special contract
against damage that such material causes when published.
But this does not prevent the newspaper from being legally
responsible for such defamation to the injured party, even
though it does provide for indemnity from the party originating the defamation.
Now a radio station can exercise the same editorial selection and the same means of protecting itself by special contract with those who use the facilities for any purpose whatsoever. If it wants indemnity from candidates for any liability to which it may subject itself in assisting them, the
broadcasting station is under complete freedom to limit its
services to such candidates as will comply with such requirements. If the profits to be gained thereby are not commensurate with the liability which is assumed, then the broaddaster might well devote his talents to some other type of
program which is more lucrative. Certainly this is a better
rule than to permit the broadcaster any degree of privilege
to defame another simply in order to meet the requirements
of a distorted notion or distorted interpretation of existing
law. The point is raised in this connection that it will be impossible under this interpretation to ever expose unfitness
for public office or corruption and misdeeds of public officials,
for all this is technically defamation. But here a choice must
be made between two evils again, and would it not be far
more harmful to give the speaker and the broadcaster unbridled authority to besmirch any and every person unjustly
just because he is running for public office than to restrict
such exposition? Abraham Lincoln 18o has said,
180
General.

Remark made when requested to dismiss Montgomery Blair, Postmaster-
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"Truth is generally the best vindication against slander."

The proposed legislation should, in order to meet this situation, include guaranties that now exist in the law of defamation where truth is concerned so that truth might be
considered an absolute defense in an action for civil damages although in an action for criminal liability truth alone
would not be a defense, since it must also be shown that the
information was published for good motive and for justifiable ends. Thus, if political corruption or unfitness of candidates for public office would be exposed by a speaker over
a broadcast station, certainly there could be no question but
that he would be acting for the best interests of the public
and so there would be no criminal responsibility. The truth
of the statement would be complete defense to any civil responsibility.
Before leaving this question of censorship it is appropriate
to discuss an injunction recently granted by Federal Judge
Akerman 181 to allow a candidate for state attorney, or
some one designated by him, to speak over the broadcasting
station four nights previous to the primary election without
censoring the speeches. The court acted, so Judge Akerman
said, to prevent irreparable damage to the plaintiff's political
campaign and right of unrestricted use of the defendant's
broadcast station and probable loss of political office. Certainly this injunction is far in excess of any authorization
contained in the federal communications law as I have
already shown, for no broadcasting station is obligated to
provide its facilities without any right of censorship and still
be held to absolute liability for damages arising from the
use of such station.
RECENT DECISIONS

An examination of some of the recent decisions, both in
this country and abroad, which have had a direct bearing
181

Morris Givens v. Radio Station WFLA, at Clearwater, Florida, 2 N. A.

B. REP. 463-4".
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on the question of defamation by radio must be included in
any discussion of this kind. In this country the case of Sorensen v. Wood ...is perhaps the most interesting and farreaching one. An appeal was taken to the United States Supreme Court but was there dismissed for the reason that
the judgment of the State court sought to be reviewed was
based on "a non-Federal ground adequate to support it." 183
Here the defendant was sued by the plaintiff for alleged
libelous utterances during a speech broadcast in a political
campaign. The radio station, having allowed Senator Norris,
a candidate for Republican nomination, the use of its facilities, also afforded the use of its facilities to senatorial candidate Stebbins who presented Wood as the speaker in his
behalf. The lower court assessed damages against Wood for
the libel and absolved the radio station, but the Supreme
Court of Nebraska held the radio station also liable, Chief
Justice Goss saying:
"The plea of the defendant that the words used by Wood were
privileged appears to be based upon the theory that Wood's speech
could not be censored because made on behalf of Stebbins, a candidate
for Senator, who had to be granted the right to speak or to have a
speech made favoring his candidacy; Senator Norris having previously
spoken over the same station in promotion of his own candidacy....
We do not think Congress intended by this language in the radio act
[Section 18 of the Radio Act (1927)] to authorize or sanction the publication of libel and thus to raise an issue with the federal constitutional
provisions prohibiting the taking of property without due process or
without payment of just compensation. Const. Fifth Amendment. This
is particularly true where any argument for exercise of the police
power and for any public benefit to be derived would seem to be against
such an interpretation rather than to be served by it. So far as we can
discover, no court has adjudicated this phase of the statute and order.
We reject the theory ....
We are of the opinion that the prohibition
of censorship of material broadcast over the radio station of a licensee
merely prevents the licensee from censoring the words as to their political
and partisan trend but does not give the licensee any privilege to join
and assist in the publication of a libel nor grant any immunity from
the consequences of such action. The Federal Radio Act confers no
privilege to broadcasting stations to publish defamatory utterances."
182

123 Neb. 348, 243 N. W. 82, 82 A. L. R. 1098 (1932).
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The same case, as has already been mentioned, holds that
defamation by radio is libel and not slander.
Another interesting case 18 is the one in which damages

were sought by the plaintiff as sheriff of Spokane County,
Washington, against the proprietor of Station KHQ, who
was alleged to have permitted a speech to be broadcast over
the station which conveyed the idea that the Sheriff had aided bootleggers. Here the court found that the station operator and his employees were connected not only with the
broadcasting and announcing of the matter involved, but
also with the preparation thereof. And the court said that
if the statements made were defamatory and untrue, they
could be jointly charged with libel. The court also held that
since statements heard over the radio are regarded by the
public as a prepared statement representing deliberation and
reflection rather than an extemporaneous affair and that defamation by radio was libel rather than slander it held the
statements libelous per se and said they were not privileged
as a publication relating to matters of public interest.
Interesting sidelights are to be observed in the foreign
cases on the question of defamation by radio. Reference is
made to Mr. J. A. Redmond's discussion of the case of Meldrum v. The Australian Broadcasting Company.8 The
Australian case holds defamation by radio to be slander
rather than libel, but attention is called to the fact that
whether the defamation is considered to be libel or slander,
the Australian courts have seen fit to undertake ways of
controlling it. It is also suggested that cases like Sorensen v.
Wood and Meldrum v. The Australian Broadcasting Company present a wider problem of stating, without help from
the legislature, a principle for distinguishing defamatory
communications of a kind previously unknown and for which
no authority exists..
Miles v. Louis Wasmer, Inc., 20 Pac. (2d) 847 (Wash. 1933).
185 AVSTRALLU LAw JOUTRNA (1933) at p. 257.
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In Privat v. Delamare186 it was said:
"Is it not more dangerous that a communication, that an emission,
be sent by radio waves which will distribute it over the five parts of
the world, which will be heard by thousands and thousands of listeners
-is it not more dangerous, I say, to be defamed by an emission of this
kind than by some worthless sheet which has but a few hundred readers? It seems absolutely necessary to express a desire that a penal law
should result from this case.... How shall this law be made? That
does not concern us, by virtue of the separation of powers-previous to
Montesquieu---of the legislative and the judiciary. Several theories may
present themselves. During -recent days have not people spoken of the
necessity of a statute on broadcasting? .

.

. There is a method....

It is to enact a special law regarding defamation and the right of reply
by radio."

The strongest argument of all for federal control of defamation by radio is contained in the recent case decided by
Federal Judge Merrill E. Otis."8 7 The case came before
Judge Otis on the question of the jurisdiction of the state
court to entertain a suit against Station KMBC for libel resulting from a broadcast over the radio station, a resident
corporation, which in no way had control of the program
coming over the Columbia Broadcasting System network and
sponsored by-Remington-Rand, Inc., in its so-called "March
of Time" feature presentation. The court held that despite
the fact the station had no control over the program and
had no way of knowing that the allegedly libelous statement
was to be uttered, it was, nevertheless, jointly liable for the
defamation. Judge Otis held that the position of the station
is analogous to that of the newspaper which is held liable
for libelous statements in its columns. The substance of the
alleged defamation was that Coffey was an "ex-convict,"
who had served time in the penitentiary. There was no element of political defamation concerned. Judge Otis, in reaching this decision, assumed a complete absence of the slightest
neglect on the part of the owner of the station, saying that
186

Cour d'Appel de Paris (10c Ch. corr.). Translated by Louis G. Caldwell,

from Rsv. JouR. INT. RADIoEL; 6e anne (1930) p. 36 (Appeal from Tribunal Cor-

rectionnel de la Seine).
187 Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 889 (W. D. Mo. 1934).
See BROAwc.AsTxnO MAGAznz VoL 8, No. 2, p. 8 (January 15, 1935).
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"But for what he [the broadcaster] had done the victim of the defamation never would have been hurt. The publisher of a newspaper
prints the libel on paper and broadcasts it to the reading world....
The owner of a radio station 'prints' the libel on a different medium
just as widely or even more widely 'read.'"

There is a strong possibility that an. appeal of the case
will be taken so that the question may ultimately come before the Supreme Court, but there is no guarantee of an early
determination of the question by the Supreme Court nor
would there be a necessity for such determination if Congress
would, as it should, take the initiative of enacting federal
legislation to settle definitely the problem once and for all.
There could remain then for the Supreme Court only to pass
upon the constitutionality of such legislation, which would
ultimately be done.
CONCLUSION

As conditions exist today in the field of defamation by
radio the entire situation is literally permeated with uncertainty. No more important problem faces either the broadcaster, the person who would use the broadcaster's facilities,
or the federal regulatory authority. We have attempted here
conclusively to prove the necessity for federal regulation. In
answer to the claims that broadcasting is substantially free
of libelous statements, I say that it is substantially, but not
absolutely, free of libel and that the proposed legislation is
needed to correct whatever percentage of libelous or defamatory matter which might be found to exist in radio broadcasting today. It is possible, and indeed probable, that many
radio speakers may defame another over the radio. Ex-President Calvin Coolidge, popularly known as "Silent Cal,"
whose speech was as guarded as any man ever to hold the
high office of President of the United States, nevertheless,
is reported to have paid a substantial sum in settlement for
alleged defamatory remarks uttered by him in the course of
a radio speech. 88
188 Vold, Defamation by Radio (1932)

2 J. Rmnio L. 699.
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I have attempted to show also that federal control of defamation by radio is peculiarly within the province of the
central governing authority, that the authority is easily to
be found both within the right to control interstate commerce and within the federal police power, and that for Congress to provide for such federal control would be no usurpation of any state right. The offense of uttering obscene, indecent or profane language 189 is already covered by the federal jurisdiction although it would seem that this might
be purely an offense within the scope of the police power
of the several states.
As has been indicated before, there is no attempt made
here to submit a draft for any proposed federal legislation,
tempting as that might be. It is suggested that the proposed legislation should provide definitely for exclusive
federal control of defamation by radio, that it should determine defamation by radio to be libel rather than slander,
that it should provide for both a civil and a criminal responsibility for defamation by radio, that the question of
venue for both civil and criminal actions be thoroughly and
definitely determined, all this to the end that there be a uniformity of control which can not help but serve to remove
much of the chaos which now exists in the field.
This is not an issue of a tomorrow but rather the issue of
a today. This legislation will be enacted ultimately in its
time and at its hour. I submit that that time and that hour
are now. Nothing can be more helpful in safeguarding the
sacred rights of man to the free communication of his ideas
in this age of the new and scientific wonder of radio communication than federal control of defamation by radio.
Joseph E. Keller.
Washington, D. C.
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